What To Do About Gaza: The Realistic Scenario

Barry Rubin
March 17, 2008
Not only is there no good solution to the Gaza problem, there's no "solution" at all, But in the Middle East, solutions are rare; what's needed is the best, imperfect, option among five alternatives:
Current policy. Israel absorbs damage and casualties in Sderot and some other places. Few are affected; almost all the country functions normally. International pressure and casualties are limited. Israel hits rocket launchers, terrorist bases, and leading terrorists periodically. Eventually, there will be an anti-rocket defense.
But aside from government's duty to its citizens, things will change. Hamas will produce larger and longer-range missiles against Ashkelon and eventually Ashdod.
Another problem with this strategy is that Western criticism defines even minimal self-defense methods as disproportionate. If you get slammed for taking punches you might as well fight back. Moreover, the West basically protects Hamas' rule in Gaza, despite sanctions and diplomatic isolation, neither of which might last. As Hamas grows more aggressive, Western policies might become more appeasing. Meanwhile, being "soft" on Hamas doesn't make peace talks work but does make Hamas look more effective than the less violent PA and Fatah.
Finally, public opinion presses government to change policy.
There are three proposals playing off a thirst for neat solutions. A ceasefire is an ideal dovish solution, overthrowing Hamas appeals to hawks, and giving the mess to an international force makes both philosophies happy. Unfortunately none of these ideas work.
A ceasefire is riddled with problems, paradoxically bringing even more violence. Hamas won't observe it, letting both its own members and others attack Israel while inciting murder through every institution. The ceasefire won't last long; Hamas would use it to strengthen its rule and army while demanding a reward for its "moderation": an end to sanctions and diplomatic isolation; even Western aid.
Re-occupy Gaza; Destroy Hamas. Sounds good. But how? Israel isn't being hit hard enough to make such a huge undertaking worthwhile. Troops would face constant attack from all directions. Once again, Israel would be involved in the daily rule of more than one million hostile people. Too many soldiers would be tied up to permit proper security in the West Bank and Lebanon border. It would be high-cost in casualties, money, and international friction.
And in the end Hamas will not be "destroyed." To defeat Hamas is not to eliminate it but to keep it as weak as possible (through military strikes, isolation, etc.) and limit its ability to hit Israel.
There's also the plan's second fallacy of turning Gaza over to a "moderate" Fatah and PA. There is no chance of their accepting this gift. In fact, Fatah would rather make a deal with Hamas than fight it. And why believe they'd do a better job than last time?
The International Solution. But there's a gimmick: the idea of turning Gaza over to an international force. This is a fantasy. Countries are not going to send forces into a war there to be attacked every day, nor will they brave criticism from Arab and Muslim states as well as terrorist attacks for no benefit.
Besides, what will the force do? Certainly not arrest thousands of Gazans, kill those trying to attack Israel, hold mass trials of terrorists and sentence them to long prison terms. Definitely not disarm Hamas or stop arms smuggling from Egypt.
And when rockets keep falling that force would block Israeli military action there. The option would also be a political disaster, with the sponsoring countries rushing to establish a Palestinian state and negotiate with Hamas. Finally, as noted above, the PA and Fatah won't take Gaza from an international force.
Push Hamas Back: What is needed is the most realistic option based on reality, not wishful thinking. Israel's interest is to minimize attacks on its soil and citizens while limiting the cost of the response needed to achieve that goal. This can be best done by combining a more active version of current policy and the creation of a security zone in the "northern" Gaza Strip to push Hamas and its allies out of range.
Such a zone could be made relatively secure because it would be on a narrow front, with flanks protected by the sea on the north and Israel proper on the south and east, with Israel controlling the airspace. This is an interim policy until anti-missile, anti-rocket defenses can be implemented, perhaps three years.
Of course, there is risk. Israeli forces will be attacked, yet they would be in a strong, fortified position and know they are protecting the civilians behind them. Some rockets will fall on Israel but the numbers would be far reduced and the area affected limited. Israel would continue to operate within Hamas-held Gaza as needed.
Will the world--which claims Israel is occupying Gaza already--do much if Israel temporarily takes back ten percent?
This issue will not be solved by negotiations, concessions, appeasement, force, or anything else. Defense Minister Ehud Barak is right: "It's not the end, the beginning of the end or the end of the beginning."
The same logic applies to Gaza as for the West Bank and Lebanon border. The main goal is for the army to minimize danger and damage so people can go about their normal lives and build up the country, protected by their soldiers.

Barry Rubin is Director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary Center university. His latest book, The Truth about Syria was published by Palgrave-Macmillan in May 2007. Prof. Rubin's columns can be read online at: http://www.gloriacenter.org/index.asp?pname=submenus/articles/index.asp.

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