The Arab World's Intellectual Mess: A Case Study
Barry Rubin
September 10, 2008
MEMRI has released report Number 1847 on September 8, 2008, entitled, "Egyptian Researcher Muhammad Al-Said Idris: The American Response to 9/11 Proves that the Official Version of Events Is False," the transcript of an interview he gave on Al-Rafidein TV on September 8, 2008. http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1847.htm
This kind of talk, of course, is both silly and dangerous. Silly because to deny that al-Qaida planned and carried out the September 11, 2003, attacks is a lie not based on any evidence and quite contrary to a huge amount of evidence.
It is dangerous because people will die and terrorist acts committed motivated by such nonsense. Indeed, one day the accumulation of lies may bring down the government of Egypt itself, leading to tens or even hundreds of thousands of casualties.
But that much is obvious. What is interesting is to analyze this interview as a case study of what goes on in the Middle East--and sadly shows signs of spreading to the West--and determines a great deal of public opinion and national policy.
Idris is no marginal figure but a researcher at Egypt's Al-Ahram center for strategic studies, arguably the Arab world's most respected think tank. It is nominally part of the newspaper but actually under government control. So Idris speaks for a powerful research center, Egypt's leading newspaper, and the Arab world's most single important government.
Let's look at this as an exercise in basic logic. Idris mentions there is an "official American version according to which 19 Arabs carried out this operation [9/11]." Of course, a serious researcher should add that this version coincides with that of Usama bin Ladin and his al-Qaida movement and of all reputable news media, many of which despise the Bush administration.
Why does Idris put it this way? Because he is used to government control of information. The dictatorship has a line; everyone sticks to it, there is no truly independent media or judiciary or academia; and the regime lies. Thus, he is unable to distinguish between a Western democratic system and a Middle Eastern dictatorship.
Next he says there are:
"Other versions, which refute the official version, say that there must have been a certain type of bomb over there, which nobody [but the Americans] could have obtained, and that it was this bomb that brought down the Twin Towers. [They say] that there are American elements involved in this affair, getting people to believe the [official] scenario, which was immediately accepted."
To be serious, one must cite specific examples, examine the credentials of those making these claims, and critically consider the accuracy of the claims. This is part of the scientific method, of the heritage of the Enlightenment.
For Idris and his colleagues, however, none of this exists. They are free to pick what suits their propaganda needs, provide no sources, weigh no credibility, and ask no questions that might challenge these versions.
Even in this presentation there is an internal contradiction. Conspiracy theorists have indeed stated that explosives were used to detonate the buildings but to my knowledge no one has spoken of some special bomb which only the U.S. government can get. (Only nuclear weapons would seem to fit that category.) This is Idris's own invention.
Contrary to an independent media, the interviewer simply reinforces Idris's viewpoint, not asking for sources or challenging anything:
"Interviewer: In addition, many building and engineering experts say that the impact of the planes could not have brought down the Twin Towers."
What experts? And, of course, the statement calls out for the response: Yes, and many more building and engineering experts, with better credentials, coming from different institutions, and having a wide variety of political views, say that the impact of the planes could and did bring down the Twin Towers."
At a minimum, an interviewer might say: "There are experts on both sides. Why is the view you present more accurate?"
But this is the spirit of an open marketplace of ideas, of debates, of systematic inquiry almost totally missing in the Arabic-speaking world.
Yet then Idris gives another argument even more fantastic than the first, which reveals far more about Egypt and the Arabic-speaking world than about America:
"Idris: That's one version, but more importantly, the immediate American reaction to the event seemed like it had been planned in advance. When an unexpected natural event takes place, the reaction is confused and disordered, until people get a grip on themselves."
Consider what he is saying: the United States has a crisis. But we know that in the Arabic-speaking world, regimes are very inefficient, no planning has been done, things don't work right. Therefore it is impossible that America can suffer an attack and then the government can quickly decide and implement policies. In short, America must be like Egypt.
And since efficiency, good decisionmaking, and organizational efficiency are impossible, the Americans must have decided in advance, knowing about the attack and indeed carrying it out themselves or they couldn't have reacted quickly:
"Interviewer: It takes some time...Idris: Yes, but in this case, all the instructions were immediately ready, and all the policies and instructions were issued.Interviewer: What do you mean?Idris: This proves that the official version is false. It also proves that there is a movement within the U.S. which has an agenda, and which will use any means to implement this agenda. This event was convenient for the movement, and it began to implement its agenda."
In Egypt, public opinion is unimportant. All decisions are made behind the scenes. Therefore, he assumes, America must be like that. Democracy must be a façade. It wasn't that the American people identified the source of the attack and decided to retaliate. In Idris's and the Arabic-speaking world's conception; only a small group can do so. And there is no such thing as the national interest, only the selfish agendas of shadowy groups seeking to exploit every occasion for its own good.
Of course, there are many groups with agendas in American life but they cannot easily ignore the American people as a whole and a wide range of independent institutions or competing forces to pull strings as if all of society, government, national debate, and public opinion are puppets. They especially could not hush up such behavior, especially when the most powerful news media is aching to find something to discredit the government and attract an audience for itself. Yet this kind of thing does happen in the Arabic-speaking world every day.
The point, then, is not that Idris and many others--let's be honest and say the vast majority of issue discussions in the Arabic-speaking world--speak lies and nonsense, it is to understand the intellectual preconceptions and social-political structures that create this situation.
We hear over and over again that the problem is that the West doesn't understand the Middle East. The truth is the exact opposite: the Middle East doesn't understand the West and is crippled by its own internal problems.
News and Opinion Based on Facts
Wednesday, September 10, 2008
Sunday, September 7, 2008
Waiting For Something
Barry Rubin
September 7, 2008
If I had to nominate the funniest cartoon I've ever seen, it was a very simple one showing a driver in a car at a "T" junction. He was staring desperately at three signs that read: No Left Turn; No Right Turn; No U-Turn.
The Middle East isn't quite like that, but the current moment--though surely temporarily--seems somewhat akin to that drawing.
It isn't as if there weren't lots of action, but that the action is merely like the above-mentioned driver revving his engine and honking his horn. I wouldn't go so far as to invoke William Shakespeare's line from "Macbeth": "Full of sound, and fury, signifying nothing." But the current moment's antics surely don't signify progress.
The Israel-Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel-Syria peace negotiations are going nowhere; the French plan to charm Syria into moderation is going nowhere; the Western attempt to lightly press (not push) Iran into abandoning its nuclear campaign is...well, you get the picture.
And then we await upcoming changes in Israeli politics (who will be prime minister and when will be elections), in American politics (who will be the next president in January), in Palestinian politics (how long will PA head Mahmoud Abbas's term last, a year or less?), in Egyptian politics (when will Egyptian President Husni Mubarak name a successor or die), and in Iranian politics (who will be elected president next June).
Contrary to conventional wisdom, it's important to understand that the impasses within the Middle East are not determined by those events, which have their own deeper, internal causes. One would think from many sources that if only President George Bush tried harder or Israel had a more stable government that there would be an Israel-Palestinian peace treaty next week. Comforting and hopeful, perhaps, but stupid.
Come to think of it, the most interesting aspect of Middle East politics today is not so much what actually happens but whether leaders will understand what is going on and devise policies that have some relationship to reality.
What's really important? While terrorist attacks make the headlines, the real historical news is being made by the quiet, daily battles for hearts, minds, and institutions between Arab regimes and Islamist oppositions. The future is being written in the internal maneuverings in which the hard-hardliners in Hamas have kicked out the relatively less-hard hardliners in the Gaza Strip. It is being assembled by the PA's total immobility regarding economic or social development and reducing corruption.
The trend is being set as the West convinces Iran and Syria that they can get away with anything, specifically continuing radical policies not only without cost but even with apparent diplomatic gains. It won't be much longer, they are saying in Tehran and Damascus, until the West gives way entirely. Syria gets Lebanon and no investigation of its terrorist assassinations there; Iran gets nuclear weapons; while Europe and America accept this new status quo.
In search of having a list of great achievements for U.S. policy under the Bush Administration, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visits Libyan dictator Muammar Qadhafi, who is being good this week. Nothing has changed substantially except Qadhafi was intimidated by a moment of perceived U.S. power, which has now passed. Given Qadhafi's proverbial restlessness, imaginative brain, and likely view that America is not so strong, this era of good feelings might not last very long.
In Iraq, every turnover of a province or statistical downturn of terrorist attacks is a signal of relative success for recent U.S. policy there. Yet this development, as good as it is, surely isn't a one-way street. Sunni tribes may not stay bought; tremendous factionalism within the Shia majority could blow up the situation. Trying to handle the repeatedly postponed issue of who controls the city of Kirkuk could lead to Arab-Kurdish conflict.
Again, though, the story is being written in the details. A new Iraq could be emerging whose main allies are the United States and Iran, a result of the Sunni Arab world's terrible mishandling of the Iraq issue, treating the Iraqi regime as a virtual pariah state.
The misunderstanding of all of this relates to what a high-ranking State Department official used to privately call "the sword in the stone" thesis. (It's such a powerful concept that even this person nowadays has fallen under its spell). Only the true king, went some variants on the legend of King Arthur, could pull the sword Excalibur from the rock. The Arab-Israeli conflict, or more generally the unstable Middle East, becomes the diplomatic equivalent. Solve it, and your name will live for all time. Oh, and you get a Nobel Peace Prize for your mantelpiece.
And so many believe that if only there was some brilliant ruler with the right ideas, everything in the Middle East could be solved. Unfortunately, this idea is usually embraced by naïve politicians with the wrong ideas. Senator Barrack Obama is currently on that list, and French President Francois Sarkozy has apparently nominated himself.
In the Middle East, the same thing takes the form of a great resistance fighter, with Salah al-Din the role model. At this point, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Syrian President Bashar al-Asad raise their hands and shout, "Me! Me!"
Note well that in the West this idea is associated with being nice to the extremists through concessions and confidence-building, while in the Middle East it is associated with being tough and violent, smiting the infidels hip and thigh. That contrast alone should tell you something.
What is needed is not some super new plan, a surfeit of charm, or the great leader but rather a great change in Middle East ideologies and societies. Not only is that process a difficult one, but it isn't even starting. To cite one example, in 2008, Palestinian moderation and realism is no greater than it was in 1988 and arguably worse than it was in 1998. To note another, there are more radical Islamists than ever. If anything, things are headed in the wrong direction and a lot of the mainstream ideas about in the West would make things worse.
Sort of makes nothing happening sound better.
Things We're Not Told
Barry Rubin
Published on Blackburn
September 7, 2008
In the olden days, when night watchmen patrolled the streets of towns, they had a standard chant: "Ten o'clock and all is well!" Sleep soundly; nothing's wrong.
Each week, when I start to write this column I hope to be able to do the equivalent. I could just write one sentence: "This week, the stories are fairly and accurately reported so there's nothing to write about."
Unfortunately, for your reading time, my workload, and the state of the world, each week there is indeed something to write about. Alas, such is true this week.
Increasingly, print media coverage comes from Associated Press and Reuters as newspapers close down costly foreign bureaus. This should be good news since these two wire services are supposed to be fair, objective, and balanced--even bland--in their presentation of events. At times in the past they have been biased against Israel, though not all the time by any means and also aware that it was not right to slant their coverage. Like Adam and Eve, driven from the Garden of Eden, they knew their nakedness and were ashamed.
Nowadays, however, both shame and restraint are gone. Many articles--again not all--are extraordinarily biased. For this to happen requires several things:
· The reporters know they will not be punished for doing so, either by verbal criticism, a slowing of their career rise, or firing.
· Editors know the same.
· High-ranking executives do not fear the complaints of their media subscribers.
· And all have redefined the purpose of journalism from fairness and accuracy to political advocacy.
Of course, they will say that this is all nonsense and they do a very good job, thank you very much. The problem, however, is that it is so ridiculously easy to show this isn't true that it is hard to believe that the evidence will not persuade at least those outside these organizations that the case is proven.
One of the most common patterns, presented repeatedly in my columns on AP, is the presentation of the Palestinian but not the Israeli side.
A second is to give Israelis who oppose their country's policy and support Palestinian positions more space than the Israeli government and mainstream view.
A third is to blame Israel for problems but not the Palestinians, or at least not the Palestinian Authority or Fatah. It is permissible to criticize Hamas.
Among the most frequent abuses is to say what the Palestinians want but not what Israel needs; to stress alleged Israeli failures to meet commitments but not even to mention--even as issues raised--Palestinian failures.
Consider Mark Lavie, "Palestinians reject Israel's offer on interim peace plan," September 1, 2008. It is true that the lead attributes Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas's rejection of Israel's idea for an interim peace agreement as "insisting on an all-or-nothing approach that virtually ruled out an accord by a January target date." Yet this is more than made up for by the space given for Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat to explain his side's position:
"We want an agreement to end the [Israeli] occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital."
What does Israel want? We don't know. We could be told: a permanent end to the conflict, incitement, and terrorism along with security guarantees for a starter. One might add border modifications or other things. But I literally cannot remember ever seeing such a passage.
We are told:
"Officials in Olmert's office said Israel has proposed giving the Palestinians all of Gaza, 93 percent of the West Bank along with Israeli land equivalent to 5.5 percent of the West Bank, as well as a land corridor through Israel to link the two territories. The Palestinians have said that offer is unacceptable."
But we are not told what the Palestinians offered Israel.
There is, however, room for two paragraphs of Palestinian complaints:
"....The Palestinians complain bitterly about continued Israeli construction in West Bank settlements, despite an Israeli pledge to halt the building as part of a 2003 peace plan that still serves as the framework for negotiations. Abbas aide Yasser Abed Rabbo called settlement construction "the most critical issue that threatens the whole peace process now."
"The Palestinians accuse Israel of swallowing up West Bank land that they claim for their state. Israel counters that it is not expanding settlements; rather, it is building inside settlement blocs it plans to keep in a final peace accord."
Does Israel have complaints? Do Israelis accuse the Palestinians of doing anything?
The rest is silence.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), with Walter Laqueur (Viking-Penguin); the paperback edition of The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan); A Chronological History of Terrorism, with Judy Colp Rubin, (Sharpe); and The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle- East (Wiley).
Wednesday, September 3, 2008
An ApartmentHouse Is Not A homeland
Like many people selling their apartments or houses, Barak must be setting the price too high. As any real estate agent can tell you, if you ask for too much money you might not make a sale. On the other hand, if you have patience, someone may come along and meet your price or something close to it.
And then it hit me: this is the ideal strategy for Israel's leaders. For a number of years, their main strategy has been to make concessions in order to be liked or in hope that this will lead to a peace deal. They acted as if they had to make an agreement fast, even on worse terms. Thus, they gave away a lot of real estate and are offering bargain basement prices for more.
This didn't work for several reasons. First, Israel could afford to be patient, far more so than many outside pretend-experts argue. Second, when you signal that you are in a hurry and willing to lower the price fast, the buyer takes advantage of that to offer even less.
So that's the answer: Israeli leaders should treat the real estate of the land of Israel like they do their own personal real estate. That doesn't mean they should never give up any land at all, but only if the price and terms are real good. Until then, they should signal, I can afford to wait. Come back when you have a serious offer.
Like Barak, Prime Minister (for a few months before he is thrown out of office and labeled the worst prime minister in Israel's history) Ehud Olmert owns some nice pieces of property, purchased no doubt by the income from his hard work and clean living. Presumably they are not alone. So just set the price high, hang tough, dare to dream you will get an offer that meets your demands and everything will be all right.
Notice to potential buyers: If you don't keep up the mortgage payments, you lose your deposit and we repossess the property.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal.
Watch on The Middle-East: a project by The Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) CenterAll material: (C) Copyright 2008 Watch on The Middle-East. All Rights Reserved.Email: info AT gloriacenter.org. You must credit if quoting and ask permission to reprint.
