Hamas: Be My Brother Or I'll kill You!

By Barry Rubin

There was an election on Hamas’s mind when it cancelled the ceasefire with Israel, leading to the Gaza war. But it wasn’t the February Israeli election but rather the January Palestinian non-election.

Four years ago, Mahmoud Abbas was elected leader of the Palestinian Authority (PA) for a two-year term. Two years ago, Hamas won a majority in the Palestinian parliamentary election. Hamas then made a coalition agreement with its rival Fatah, which previously controlled the PA. Shortly thereafter, Hamas staged a bloody coup and threw Fatah out of the Gaza Strip. But Fatah, and Abbas, still controls the internationally recognized PA and the West Bank.

While Hamas and Israel went to war, Israel and the PA remained at peace. The war had nothing to do with Israel-Palestinian relations as such but as a response to Hamas’s extremism, rejecting not only any comprehensive peace agreement with Israel but even a real truce. How, then, does this triangular relationship figure in Palestinian politics?

Analysts have generally ignored the proximity of Hamas’s decision for war to its impending January 2009 showdown with Abbas, Fatah, and the PA. It was widely predicted that Abbas was going to announce that, given the impossibility of holding new elections, he would simply extend his term for another year.

The event was expected to mark a major widening of the rift between the two groups. Hamas, it was thought, would declare Abbas a usurper, name its own candidate for “president,” and the establishment of two rival Palestinian governments would be complete.

Even before that date, the PA had apparently enjoyed some real success—with Israeli help—in reducing Hamas’s organization on the West Bank, ensuring any takeover bid there would be impossible, and making progress toward restoring order and even improving the economy.

Hamas no doubt saw choosing war as a way of upstaging Abbas, showing that it was the real fighter for Palestinian rights (principally the right to wipe Israel off the map), and even attracting support from some Fatah men who concluded that Hamas was macho and their own organization was too meek. In effect, it was a reiteration of traditional Palestinian politics in which those who take the most extreme action, evidence the greatest intransigence, and kill the most Israelis prove their credentials for leadership.

In practice, though, Hamas played into Abbas’s hands. Now he has the perfect rationale to insist that elections cannot be held—which is, of course quite true--and he must remain as leader for the indefinite future.

Despite this, the relationship between Hamas and Fatah remain quite complex. It seems bizarre that Hamas set off a civil war, murdered Fatah men in cold blood, and kicked the group out of Gaza yet still most of Fatah is ready to forgive it. There is a strong likelihood that if given the choice, Fatah leaders—though not necessarily Abbas himself—would prefer conciliation with Hamas, which would make any peace with Israel impossible—to making a diplomatic deal with Israel and getting a Palestinian state.

From Israel’s standpoint, of course, how can it negotiate any comprehensive solution with the PA when it cannot deliver half of the territory, people, and armed men who are supposed to be bound by such an agreement? Moreover, the possibility that either Hamas will overthrow Fatah at some future point or even that the two will join together in a new war against Israel rather puts a damper on Israeli willingness to make concessions.

The paradox of a simultaneous blood feud and brotherly love relationship between the two Palestinian organizations is explained by the supposed sanctity of being fellow Arabs, Muslims, and Palestinians, coupled with a deep and abiding loathing of Israel.

Yet this also coexists with such deep Fatah anger at Hamas that interviewed Fatah cadre told reporters that they were glad Israel was trouncing Hamas in Gaza Strip. The solution of this paradox was for the official PA line to be: it’s all Hamas’s fault but there should be an immediate ceasefire and Israel is behaving in a beastly way.

This approach is strengthened by the fact that most Arab states and a surprising amount of the media (albeit in many cases the two are identical) are taking a similar line. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the smaller Gulf states and more—pretty much all the leaders except for Syria—hate Hamas. They see it as an agent of Iran, meaning a friend of their Islamist opponents.

If Fatah were more adept politically, it could benefit from this situation. A clever and active policy would combine an energetic campaign to unite the Arab states behind the PA, while persuading the UN and West that they should ensure its restoration to power in the Gaza Strip as the “legitimate government.” The Fatah underground in the Gaza Strip would be reinforced and figure out some way (even with a little secret coordination with Israel) to oust Hamas and seize power at least in sections of the territory.

Yet both the PA and Fatah lack the will power and political skill to take advantage of such a promising situation. They are sitting back and hoping that someone—though not Israel—will give them back the Gaza Strip on a silver platter. The problem also includes their lack of charismatic leadership and failure to deal seriously with the problems that led them to being kicked out by the election: corruption, incompetence, and the failure to articulate a moderate vision of achievable peace with Israel.

No outside power, including Israel, and no amount of money can make up for the shortcomings of the PA and Fatah. Thus, it is much easier for Hamas to lose the war than for the nationalist forces to win.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA)Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.
His books include The Israel-Arab Reader,

Revolution Until Victory, The Tragedy of the Middle East, and Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography.

THE BATTLE AGAINST THE TERRORISM OF CRIME

Update: Just hours after publishing this article, Dr. Sneh's car was torched outside his home in Herzliya.

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1232643738584&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

He told the Jerusalem Post: “It's very clear to me that this is the work of criminals," Sneh said. "I don't know if the criminal read the [party] platform, but it's possible that other things we've done led to this violent message. Remember that last month alone, four mayors were victims of violent attacks by criminals." Sheh, a former deputy defense minister, said that he did not fear for his life, despite the arson attack. "I'm a man who comes from years of service in the war on terror, and there were personal threats of my life when I was serving in that capacity, but it doesn't deter me," he said defiantly. “

By Ephraim Sneh

After the fighting in Gaza ceased, the internal terrorism in our country again raised its head. This week, just one day apart, two attacks were made against elected officials. A grenade was hurled at the house of Kiryat Ekron Council Chairman Arik Hadad. A day later an explosive device was thrown at the house of Beit Jan Council Chairman, Dayan Kablan. Three weeks ago a grenade was thrown at the house of Kiryat-Yam’s mayor, Shmuel Sisso. Two weeks ago the police discovered a conspiracy to murder Bat-Yam Mayor Shlomi Lahiani. A veritable crime offensive. The common denominator between these four cases is the struggle of the mayors and local councils against criminals seeking to gain control of business assets through violence. The ominous fact is that the criminals are no longer hesitating to use military means to attack persons elected by the public. Deterrence has been lost.

What must be done when deterrence has been lost? Renew it. Had the Hamas ever likewise tried to attack Israeli elected officials, we presumably would have launched a major military offensive against it. Yet when it is the crime families the attitude is different. The crime families and the other assorted offenders will not be deterred if there is no adequate response to them. In their present circumstances the police and the law authorities are finding it hard to fight crime in the intensity and scope that are needed.

The plan I have prepared for the war on crime, and which I plan to implement as Minister of Internal Security, is the approach we need right now. A war against the crime families and the hundreds and perhaps thousands of criminal incidents which take place in Israel daily. Crimes against the elderly, against children, against business owners and so forth.

This plan has the following components:

• Stiffening penalties for serious crimes.

• Emergency legislation to give more effective tools to fight organized crime.

• Establishing a system to protect law officials, government and tax workers.

• Economic measures against the crime families.

• A special operation to fight the protection rackets.

• Bolstering the police with resources and manpower. Rehabilitation and strengthening of the status of the policeman and the prestige of service.

This is a practical plan. It is not built simply on budgetary increases and added legislation. Fundamentally, it will provide both leadership and judicial and economic backing to those who are fighting crime, which has become such a plague in our country.

Our government’s feeble attitude toward crime is part of the process the state has been undergoing over the last twelve years. The process led by Binyamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister and Finance Minister has been one of an abandonment by government of its responsibilities toward the citizen. That’s how it’s been with health-care and geriatric services, with education, with pension security, and with all the realms of social service. But personal safety is a just as much a fundamental civic right as the right to health and to an education for one’s children.

I believe that eliminating crime is possible and I mean to prove it.

Dr. Sneh is a medical doctor, veteran of many years in the Israel Defense Force in both medical and combat roles, including serving as head of the civil administration for the West Bank. He served in the Knesset for 16 years as a Labor party member of parliament and has held the positions as minister of health, of transportation, and deputy defense minister.

In May 2008 he resigned from the Knesset and the Labour party, later forming the Strong Israel party. The party supports a strong but flexible foreign policy and highlights the Iranian threat. It puts a strong emphasis on domestic issues, insisting that government must remembers its main duty is to serve citizen’s needs and to ensure honesty in its own ranks. A strong Israel requires not merely an effective military but also honest government, a strong educational and health system, and improving the environment and infrastructure.

If you are interested in joining the party or supporting its efforts, please contact me, as head of the English-speaking section. Note that we have two Anglophones, including myself, on our Knesset list. Also visit our site at http://www.israelhazaka.org.il/92-en/FAQ.aspx.

Translated by Saadya Sternberg

Radical Chic Islam

A New Video by Michael Blackburn, Sr

Report: Hamas Lied About Gaza Casualties

This report is from Arutz Sheva News.
Its not really surprising, but its good that the facts are beginning to come out.
MFB

01/22/09, 4:54 PM
Report: Hamas Lied About Gaza Casualties

by Maayana Miskin


(IsraelNN.com) Italian journalist Lorenzo Cremonesi, who works with the Corriere della serra newspaper, reported Thursday that Hamas had vastly overstated the number of civilian deaths in Gaza. While Hamas claims that 1,330 residents of Gaza were killed in the operation and approximately 5,000 wounded, the real number of casualties was far lower, Cremonesi says.

Cremonesi's report was based on his own findings after touring hospitals in Gaza and talking to families of those killed or wounded. “It is sufficient to visit several [Gaza] hospitals to understand that the numbers don't add up,” he explained.
Cremonesi estimated that between 500 to 600 people were killed in the fighting. Most were young men between the ages of 17 and 23 who were members of Hamas, he said.

Many hospitals had several empty beds, he reported. Hamas has stated that Gaza hospitals are filled to capacity due to the large number of victims, with many of the wounded being turned away due to the shortage of doctors and supplies.

The Italian report also confirmed Israeli allegations that Hamas had used civilians as human shields and used ambulances and United Nations buildings in the fighting. Those who tried to drive the terrorists away in order to protect their families were beaten.

Civilians told Cremonesi that they shouted at Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists to leave the area to avoid drawing Israeli fire on civilians. The terrorists responded by calling them “traitors,” “collaborators” and “cowards,” and insisted that any civilians killed would be martyrs destined for paradise.

Civilians also reported that Hamas terrorists disguised themselves as paramedics and drove ambulances during the fighting. In addition, terrorists launched rockets from UN buildings. Many of these actions are defined as war crimes.

"The knew they were weaker, but they wanted them [the Israelis] to fire on our houses, so they could accuse them of war crimes,” a resident of the Gazan village Tel Awa explained.

Cremonesi said it was difficult to gather evidence against Hamas because residents were fearful. Civilians feared that if it was known they spoke against the group, they would be harshly punished, he explained.

Eisenberg: Many Didn't Know Their Homes were Booby-Trapped
Gaza Division Commander Brig.-Gen. Eyal Eisenberg reported on Thursday that Hamas had booby-trapped the homes of many civilians without their knowledge.

Many Gaza civilians were surprised to find explosives hidden under their houses, Eisenberg said, and noted that Hamas had placed roadside bombs throughout the area as well.